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I n tr o d u c tio n
Beyond the m igration of workers from structurally weak countries and 1 from occupational fields with connections to foreign countries such as transportation or tourism , entirely new forms of m igrant labour are increasingly gaining importance in today's professional life in Europe and elsewhere: the vast and rapid developments in inform ation technol ogy, the steady increase of cross-border exchange of goods and services and the necessity of a global perspective for companies dem and a growing involvement in foreign countries be it a branch office, a project abroad or international co-operation w ithin the framework of a joint venture. Simultaneously, new careers abroad are possible giving new opportunities for companies and employees alike. Such internationalisation of employ m ent of course involves dangers and risks for all parties concerned; risks which materialise mostly in the area of workers' compensation and employers' liability.
In this context the social safeguarding of the employee m ust be secured 2 and a num ber of relevant questions arise. As the European Union does not provide material rules on cross-border employment b u t rules on the coordination of the M ember States' social security schemes regarding inter alia workers' compensation, rules on the law applicable m ust be envisaged. Accordingly, questions to be addressed in this contribution include which state's system of social security applies under which cir cumstances and how such questions are adjudicated. Correspondingly the law applicable and the international jurisdiction for questions of employ ers' liability and when damages should be awarded to expatriates under these conditions are to be addressed. Ultimately, regard m ust be taken of the connections between both legal institutes when recourse rights of workers' compensation institutions are assessed. 485 II. E m p iric a l E vidence 3 Reliable empirical evidence for the fact-patterns addressed by this report was virtually impossible to gather since most data collections refer either to a national picture only and/or do not distinguish between m igrating EU nationals, (ie persons insured under a M ember State's scheme other than their place of employment, etc) and people coming from outside the European Union. This difference, which relates to the right to free entry and free movement in the EU M ember States, is often om itted and both terms '(intra-EU) m igrants' and 'im m igrants' are used interchangeably.1
4 In any case a clear trend regarding intra-EU migrants is the significant increase in their num ber in the last decade which is clearly related to the EU integration given the free movement of people for the accessing countries and the establishment of an enlarged unified European labour market. free movement of the at the tim e 'new' EU-105 nationals to work in the 'old' EU-156 countries. Originally only the UK, Ireland and Sweden allowed EU-10 m igrants to enter and work after these countries joined the EU whereas Finland, Portugal and Spain allowed free movement only after 1 May 2006, b u t the rem ainder of the EU-15 countries still m ain tained restrictions. Since the beginning of 2011 complete freedom of movement for workers from the M ember States which joined in May 2004 is guaranteed, eventually resulting in a significantly higher intraEuropean migration.
III. W o rk e rs' C o m p e n s a tio n A. L im ita tio n to n a tio n a l te r r ito r y
The industrial development in many nations in the late 19th century was 6 accompanied by the establishment of m odern social security systems7 as the decomposition of pre-industrial forms of social security (eg family and agricultural village structures) forced the development of externalised solutions. Since the general trigger for the creation of these systems was to m aintain social justice and peace in nation states, it should come as no surprise that the legislative outcome was purely domestic as well: the socalled welfare state correlated with the nation state and the effects (bene fits in kind and cash) were lim ited to the nationals of the latter.8 As social security law was the result of purely national social policies and primarily focused on the national economy as well as the domestic societal circum stances, it was inherently bound to the territory of the nation state. Due to this 'nationalism ' of the social security systems, difficulties appeared in cases of individuals who were not domiciled in the nation state of their employment, for example, cross-border commuters and frontier workers. In cases of accidents at work or occupational accidents, these individuals were excluded from all benefits in kind or cash, simply because they were not nationals of the state in which they had paid social security contribu tions and would accordingly not be entitled to receive benefits.9
7 This nation-state related lim itation, better known as the 'territoriality principle',10 was rendered anachronistic w ith the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. This forerunner of the EU explicitly guarded the free movement of goods, capital, services and people as well as the freedom of establishment11 and aimed at liberating the nation states' m utually closed markets by creating a Common Market.
In such a Common M arket cross-border commuters and frontier workers were constitutive and, hence, the social security systems of the M ember States had to be coordinated.12
B. E u ro p e a n c o o rd in a tio n o f social s e c u rity sy stem s social security systems by stating: 'The European Parliament and the Council s h a ll... adopt such measures in the field of social security as are necessary to provide freedom of movement for workers; to this end, they shall make arrangements to secure for employed and self-employed mi grant workers and their dependants: (a) aggregation, for the purpose of acquiring and retaining the right to benefit and of calculating the am ount of benefit, of all periods taken into account under the laws of the several countries; (b) payment of benefits to persons resident in the territories of M ember States.' Accordingly, any system to be created on the basis of art 48 TFEU m ust 9 ensure that an individual does not suffer losses in his or her social security protection whilst exercising rights of freedom of movement of workers in the M ember States.14
C. S o u rces o f law
In order to coordinate the Member States' social security systems under 10 this paradigm, Council Regulation (EC) No 1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to members of their families moving w ithin the Community was adopted in 1971.15 This Regulation was accompanied by im plem enting Regulation (EEC) No 574/72,16 which covered the practical im plem enta tion (eg competent national authorities, administrative formalities, etc).17 Apart from some provisions in the field of non-discrim ination,18 Regula tion 1408/71 had a trem endous impact on the M ember States19 as the Community instrum ent restricted the national legislative and adm inis trative powers to decide exclusively on m ain elements of the national social security systems. In addition, the Regulation rules were interpreted in the same way and E. G e n e ra l ru le s f o r d e te r m in in g t h e le g is la tio n a p p lic a b le 1. G e n e ra l a p p lic a tio n o f t h e law o f th e c o u n try o f e m p lo y m e n t where the employee does not reside in the country where he is employed and to cases where the employer has his seat in another country.42
Although the Regulation does not provide a definition of the 'place of 17 employment', some inference m ight be taken from the rules for tem por ary employment abroad:43 the place of the actual provision of services has less importance than the place where the social and economic value of the services is eventually created.44 2. S pecial p ro v isio n s fo r d e te r m in in g t h e le g is la tio n a p p lic a b le a) T e m p o ra l p o s tin g a b ro a d In order 'to promote freedom to provide services for the benefit of under-18 takings which avail themselves of it by sending workers to M ember States other than that in which they are established and aim ing at overcoming obstacles likely to impede freedom of movement of workers and also at encouraging economic interpenetration whilst avoiding administrative complications, in particular for workers and undertakings', In particular the first part of this rule is in accordance with art 11 Regula-23 tion 883/2004 according to which the law at the place of the substantial activity is applied. In the cases of m ultiple activities in several countries, the domicile of the employer could be stipulated. However, this is only possible because it is at the same tim e the place of employment at least for a substantial part of the activities.
F re e d o m o f c h o ice
As set out above, the Regulation enshrines as a general rule the application 24 of the law at the place of substantial activities as an employee and accordingly that the social security system in this M ember State is the competent one.50 However, the Regulation provides for certain situations in which it seems reasonable to continue the application of the original social security system.51
Article 16 , an employee who has had an accident at work or has contracted an occupational disease and who resides or stays in a M ember State other than the competent M ember State54 shall be entitled to the benefits in kind and cash of the scheme covering accidents at work and occupational diseases, on behalf of the competent institution, by the institution of the place of residence in accordance w ith the legislation which it applies, as though he were insured under said legislation.
28 Moreover, art 38 Regulation 883/2004 covers benefits for occupational diseases where a person has been exposed to the same risk in several M ember States. If such a person pursued an activity which is by its nature likely to cause such diseases, the benefits that he/she or his/her survivors may claim shall be provided exclusively under the legislation of the last of those States whose conditions are satisfied. Hence the competent institu tion has to decide under its own law whether or not the employee has contracted an occupational disease and has to finance the benefits exclu sively although the causes for the disease are spread to several other countries. Although this solution seems barely in line w ith other princi ples in insurance law55 and burdens those M ember States which attract the greatest degree of labour m igration, one has to welcome it for the facilita- In cases of an aggravation of a pre-existing occupational disease and an 30 associated reduction in earning capacity, the respective increase in benefits will be borne by the competent authorities under art 38 Regulation 883/ 200458 if the worker has not pursued an activity as an employed person in another M ember State. If the person concerned, while in receipt of benefits, has nevertheless pursued an activity under the legislation of another M ember State, the competent institution of the original, first M ember State shall continue to bear the cost, however, taking the aggra vation into account. The competent institution of the second Member State (ie the M ember State where the aggravation took place) shall grant a supplem ent to the worker, the am ount of which shall be equal to the difference between the am ount of benefits due after the aggravation and the am ount which would have been due prior to the aggravation. 33 In contrast, the Advisory Committee could be empowered at the request of the Commission of the European Union, the Administrative Commission or on its own initiative to examine general questions or questions of principle and problems arising from the im plem entation of the Union provisions on the coordination of the national social security systems. The committee should form ulate opinions on such m atters for the Adminis trative Commission and proposals for any revisions.
G. A d m in is tra tio n a n d a d ju d ic a tio n o f c la im s
34 Regarding the adjudication of claims, the question w hether or not a court is competent to hear a case does not depend on the domicile or nationality of the claimant b u t on the law applicable to his claim. If the claim is to be assessed under German law, German courts are competent to hear the case; hence, the competent courts and applicable law are to a large extent synchronised.
H. R ig h ts o f re c o u rs e o f w o rk e rs ' c o m p e n s a tio n i n s titu tio n s a n d in te r a c tio n w ith e m p lo y e rs ' lia b ility 35 Whenever benefits are provided by the institution of a M ember State on behalf of the institution of another M ember State (eg in cases where an employee resides or stays in a M ember State other than the competent M ember State: see no 27 ff above) the authority providing for benefits is entitled to reim bursem ent from the competent authority under art 41 in conjunction with art 35 Regulation 883/2004.61 In the special case of occupational diseases, the reim bursem ent between the (potentially sev eral) institutions where the employee has contracted the disease is dis tributed between the several institutions depending on the tim e the employee spent in the various countries of exposure to the causes of the disease.
Regarding the rights of institutions to reim bursem ent against liable third 36 parties, the peculiarities and differences in the organisation of Member States' social security systems tend to pose problems some of which were addressed by the European legislator and the CJEU. As a starter, in some M ember States' social security systems a branch dedicated to workers' compensation m ight be simply unknow n.62 According to art 40 Regula tion 883/2004, in all M ember States' systems where there is no insurance against accidents at work or occupational diseases, benefits shall be provided by the institution responsible for providing benefits in the event of sickness.
Of certainly more interest are cases in which one M ember State's institu-37 tion provides benefits in respect of an injury resulting from adverse events occurring in another M ember State (see eg no 27 ff above). In a purely domestic dispute the institution providing benefits regularly obtains a claim of subrogation63 or a direct claim against the liable third party (tortfeasor). Of course, such a right will also exist in all cases w ith a foreign element: according to art 85 Regulation 883/2004, any institution's claim for subrogation to the rights which the beneficiary has against the third party or direct rights against the third party shall be recognised by any other Member State.
The inherent problem with this rule becomes apparent when assessing the 38 other applicable law to the case. Regarding some claims64 by the employee against the tortfeasor65 in tort law, art 4( In fact, the CJEU does not follow any specific national systematisation or 45 approach, but has stated that concepts in conflict of laws 'm ust be given an autonom ous meaning, derived from the objectives and schemes of the instrum ent and the general principles underlying the national systems as a whole.'77 And although considerations relevant to determ ining this characterisation for the purposes of allocating jurisdiction may not neces sarily be identical to those relevant to determ ine the choice of law issues, the massive impact of the earlier CJEU decisions m ust be taken into account following the explicit order of the European legislator in Recital 7 dem anding consistency between the documents.78
Alongside these observations regard should be taken of two m ain judg-46 ments when analysing the CJEU's notion of the borderline between the two institutions. In Kalfelis79 the court held that the expression 'matters relating to a tort, delict or quasi-delict' covered all actions seeking to establish the liability of a defendant and which are not related to a contract and thereby established it as residual.80 In Handte v TMCS81 the CJEU held that 'm atters relating to a contract' covered only situations in which one party assumes an obligation towards another and stressed the importance of a direct contractual nexus between the parties.
47 As indicated, various provisions of each Regulation also give some indica tions as to the scope of the concept of contract and tort. A virtually perfect illustration of the above-mentioned methodology of Rabel focusing on the objectives of the rules and the general principles beyond them is the logistic system around dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract (culpa in contrahendo). Such liability raises difficult problems of classification both under substantive domestic law as well as under private international law as some M ember States regard the pre-contractual obligation on which the cause of action is based as contractual, others as tortious, yet others as a claim sui generis.82 Both Rome Regulations have adopted a comparative approach to classification. Instead of focusing on the national domestic systematisation and the underlying dogmas, the legislator focused on the violated duties upon which the cause of action is based. Indeed some European jurisdictions feature actions under the title culpa in contrahendo protecting the interests of potential negotiating partners (for example, the duty to protect against personal injury), thus being akin to tort law, whereas other actions labelled as culpa in contrahendo are related to the (future) contract itself (for example, a violation of the duty of disclosure) and are thus protecting against economic losses. The Rome II Regulation took up this differentiation and constructed a system to distinguish the actions based on the respective duties. Recital 30 Rome II Regulation states accordingly that 'culpa in contrahendo for the purposes of this Regulation is an autonom ous concept and should not necessarily be interpreted w ithin the m eaning of national law. It should include the violation of the duty of disclosure and the breakdown of contractual negotiations. Art 12 (Rome II Regulation) covers only non-contractual obligations presenting a direct link w ith the dealings prior to the conclu sion of a contract. This means that if, while a contract is being negotiated, In general the law applicable is determ ined in accordance with the rules laid down by arts 3 and 4 Rome I Regulation. These refer, primarily, to any law expressly agreed on by the parties to the contract; secondarily, to a choice of law implicitly, b ut clearly agreed on by the parties, and finally, in default of any such choice, to the law of the residence of the characteristic performer. For certain particular types of contracts such as employment contracts, special rules, often designed to protect the socio-economic weaker party, are laid down by arts 5-8 Rome I Regulation.
Scope o f p r o te c tio n
Article 1(1) Rome I Regulation specifies that the Regulation applies, in 50 situations involving a foreign element, to contractual obligations in civil and commercial matters; it does not apply to revenue, customs or adminis trative matters. According to art 12 Rome I Regulation, the law applicable to a contract shall govern in particular the interpretation, performance, the consequences of a total or partial breach of obligations, including the assessment of damages insofar as it is governed by rules of law, the various ways of extinguishing obligations, prescription and lim itation of actions and, finally, the consequences of nullity of the contract.
3. G e n e ra l ru le s f o r d e te r m in in g t h e le g is la tio n a p p lic a b le 51 Of the uniform rules established by the Rome I Regulation, foremost and dom inant is the rule expressed in the first sentence of art 3(1) stating that a 'contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties.'84 Accord ingly under the Rome I Regulation, the applicable law to a contract is determ ined primarily by reference to any express agreement on the point concluded by the parties to the contract and is commonly referred to by the term of 'party autonom y'. Only in the absence of any express choice is reference made, secondarily, to an implied choice of the parties. Regarding the question which law could be chosen, it seems clear that under the Rome I Regulation the 'law' m ust be the law of any country, in the sense of a territory having its own legal rules on contracts. Thus it cannot be the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations or the Unidroit Principles or the (Draft) Common Frame of Reference.85 In addition, the parties m ust consider three further restrictions on a choice 52 of law. Firstly any subsequent86 choice by the parties cannot prejudice the formal validity of the contract or adversely affect the rights of third parties.87 Secondly, the choice is restricted where all other elements relevant to the situation at the time of the choice are located in a country other than the country whose law has been chosen. In these cases the choice of the parties shall not prejudice the application of the provisions of the law of that other country which cannot be derogated from by agreement. Thirdly and finally, where all other elements relevant to the situation at the time of the choice are located in one or more Member States, the parties' choice of law other than the law of a Member State shall not prejudice the application of provisions of EU law, where appropriate as implemented in the Member State of the forum, which cannot be derogated from by agreement.88
Where the parties have not chosen an applicable law in accordance with 53 art 3 Rome I Regulation, it is clearly necessary to provide for default rules designating the applicable law. Accordingly, in the absence of any valid choice by the parties, the applicable law to a contract is determined in line with art 4 Rome I Regulation providing a list of strict rules.89 The main effect of these rules is to provide a list of rebuttable presumptions in favour of the law of the characteristic performer's residence, which may be dis placed by clearly establishing a closer connection with another country.90 
Special p ro v isio n s f o r in d iv id u a l e m p lo y m e n t c o n tra c ts 54
The operation of arts 3 and 4 Rome I Regulation is nevertheless w ithout prejudice to several other articles of the Regulation establishing special rules for selecting the applicable law for special categories of contracts. The rules applicable to such special categories of contracts derogate both arts 3 and 4 Rome I Regulation by restricting party autonom y and estab lishing a specified m ethod for selecting the applicable law in the absence of any choice of the parties.
55 In this context, art 8 Rome I Regulation makes special provision for individual contracts of employment. By art 8(1) Rome I Regulation the possibility of an express or implied choice of law by the parties is explicitly granted when determ ining the applicable law of an employment contract, but -as envisaged by recital 23 Rome I Regulation91 -such choice operates subject to the rules for the protection of the employee as a socio-economic weaker party. As a result, a choice of law may not have the result of depriving the employee of the protection afforded to him by provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement under the law that, in the absence of choice, would have been applicable.92
56 In view of the protective purpose of art 8(1) Rome I Regulation, 'provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement' include but are not limited to claims for unfair dismissal,93 in respect of unlawful discrimination in rela tion to employment,94 special rules granting bonuses, maternity leave, compulsory subsidies to pregnant employees to be granted by the employer95, continuing wages during periods of employee's illness,96 part time employment97 and finally provisions such as those concerning indus trial safety and hygiene which are regarded in certain Member States as being provisions of public law.98 The result of the application of these rules is not however a complete dismissal of the violating contract, but the application of the distinct rule which may result in the employee 'cherrypicking'.99
Para 2 of the provision determines (almost in passing) the place of the 57 characteristic performance in individual employment contracts and thus derogates art 4 Rome I Regulation: according to art 8(2) Rome I Regula tion, the applicable law is that of the country in or from which the employee habitually carries out his work in performance of the contract, and this country of habitual work remains unchanged even if the em ployee is temporarily employed in another country.100 If there is no ascertainable country of habitual residence, art 8(3) Rome I Regulation refers instead to the law of the country in which the place of business through which the employee was engaged is situated.101 Ultimately both these rules are reduced to rebuttable presum ptions by art 8(4) Rome I Regulation which operates where it appears from the circumstances that the contract is more closely connected with a country other than that indicated in art 8(2) or (3), and subjects the contract to the law of that other country. law will be the law of country in which the damage occurs, 'irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred'104 and 'regardless of the country or the countries of personal injury or damage to property, the country in which the damage occurs should be the country where the injury was sustained or the property was damaged respectively.'105
C. T h e Law
4. E scape c la u se This general rule is subject to particular exceptions operating on the 61 existence of common habitual residence or otherwise closer relationship of the parties to the case. Firstly, if both parties were habitually resident in the same country, the tort is governed by the law of that country. Secondly -and of most relevance to this topic -art 4(3) Rome II Regulation provides an exception, described in Recital 18 of the Regulation as an escape clause, in favour of the law of another country which has a manifestly closer relationship with the tort.
The second sentence of art 4(3) Rome II Regulation sets out that such a 62 manifestly closer connection may be based in particular on a pre-existing relationship between the parties, such as a contract. The Explanatory Mem orandum 106 states implicitly107 that such a pre-existing relationship could consist of an employment contract when considering that due to the escape clause in art 4(3), the Rome II Regulation cannot have the effect, in relation to torts, of depriving the weaker party of the protection of the law which protects him, as regards contracts, under art 6 Rome I Regulation. It is submitted that this can only mean that in case of a tort related to an existing employment contract, the conflicts rule concerning the latter would prevail and the rules expanded on above could apply which would normally result in the application of the law of the underlying contractual obligation.108 In any case, the Explanatory Memorandum expressly states that the application of the escape clause must remain exceptional, must provide a manifestly close relationship to the tort and finally that the sole aim of the provision is to ensure that one and the same relationship may be covered by the law of contract in one Member State and the law of tort/delict in another can be mitigated, until such time as the CJEU comes up with its own autonomous response to the situation. 3. R u les fo r in te r n a tio n a l ju r is d ic tio n in r e la tio n to c o n tra c ts o f e m p lo y m e n t
As the original version of the 1968 Brussels I Convention did not provide 65 any tailored rules for individual employment contracts, the CJEU dis cerned the purpose of protecting employees on account of their weaker socio-economic position and accordingly adopted special rules for inter national jurisdiction in relation to contracts of employment setting aside the original general regim e.114 Building on these rulings, the 1989 version of the Brussels Convention made specific provisions for individual con tracts of employment and the present-day Brussels I Regulation extracted the respective judgm ents in arts 18-21 of the Regulation.
According to art 18(1) Brussels I Regulation, the rules on jurisdiction over 66 individual contracts of employment operate w ithout prejudice to art 4 Brussels I Regulation,115 on defendants not domiciled in a M ember State, and to art 5(5) Brussels I Regulation116, on secondary establishment of the defendants. Article 18(2) Brussels I Regulation combines both models, for example an employer who is not domiciled in any M ember State b u t has a branch in a M ember State; such employer is -with regard to disputes arising out of the operations of the branch -deemed to be domiciled in the M ember State of secondary establishment. 68 Conversely if an employer brings proceedings against his employee, the policy of protecting the socio-economic weaker party is clearly reflected in art 20(1) Brussels I providing that the employer may only sue the em ployee in the courts of the M ember State where the employee is domiciled and thus bars the possibility of bringing proceedings at his workplace.118 Moreover, art 20 Brussels I Regulation does not provide any alternative jurisdiction for the employer to sue, but, however, permits by way of exception in art 20(2) Brussels I Regulation an employer to subm it a counterclaim in the court in which a claim by the employee is pending.
69 Finally, art 21 Brussels I Regulation admits freedom of choice w ith respect to the determ ination of competent courts in m atters of individual employ m ent contracts. Such choice may prevail also over the aforementioned rules in arts 18-20 Brussels I Regulation b u t -to ensure the effectiveness of the protective policy -is subject to two exceptions. Firstly an agreement is allowed when it is entered into after the dispute has arisen and perm itted only insofar as it allows the employee to bring proceedings in additional courts. E. R ig h ts o f re c o u rs e a n d in te r a c tio n b e tw e e n e m p lo y e rs ' lia b ility a n d w o rk e rs ' c o m p e n s a tio n Given the potentially applicable Regulations to claims based on employ-70 ers' liability, one of the essential questions in this report was which law governs recourse between the liable employer and the social security institution (which has already provided benefits). Given the different Regulations and the potentially divergent laws applicable, the likelihood was high that the redress between employers liable in one country and social security institutions handing out benefits in another was not entirely coordinated.
Reality being the antithesis of expectation, none of the initial fears 71 transpired. As set out previously119 art 85 Regulation 883/2004 stipulates that the subrogation of a social security institution and the extent of the rights to which that institution is subrogated are to be determ ined in accordance with the law of the M ember State to which the institution belongs and thereby postulates a specific conflict rule for the law applic able to the recourse of a social security institution. According to art 23 Rome I Regulation and art 27 Rome II Regulation, neither Regulation shall prejudice the application of provisions of EU law which, in relation to particular matters, lay down conflict of law rules relating to contractual or non-contractual obligations. As art 85 Regulation 883/2004 is most obviously a provision of EU law and lays down a rather specific rule for the law applicable to the recourse of a social security institution, it prevails accordingly.
V. A lte rn a tiv e s, E v a lu a tio n a n d C o n c lu sio n s
The interaction between workers' compensation and employers' liability 72 revealed itself as a fine machinery which -against initial doubts -works incredibly well. However the approach chosen by the European legislator remains open to criticism. The current coordination of European social security involves two Regulations each consisting of more than 100 articles, a m ultitude of decisions rendered on the topic by the CJEU and, given the rejection of a more simplistic approach in the latest, revised version of the more recent Regulation,120 is bound to become more labyrinthine with its m aturation. Moreover, the current distributive model, that is, the handling of claims by separate institutions in all M ember States, results in excessive bureaucracy and correspondingly exorbitant costs.
73 A radical alternative121 to the existing conflicts based model -merely stipulating a M ember State's material law -could be an 'Intra-Community Model' for social security consisting as an original European Social Secur ity System. Such a 'post-coordinative' model was developed and promoted by Pieters in the 1990s at a time when the Union consisted of 12 M ember States; accordingly Pieters subsequently named his idea as 'The thirteenth state'.122 He envisaged an autonom ous, comprehensive, contribution based, 'unitary' European Social Security System (ESSS) which would address m igrant workers only. Although membership of the ESSS could be optional, Pieters envisaged opening the system after a period of initial im plem entation thus allowing the ESSS to be in direct competition with the social security system in the M ember States. Such a new start would also have the advantage that the implicit social security debt of earlier generations would not have to be borne by the current contributors. Since the m aturation of the ESSS would be in a rather distant future one could upgrade benefits to create an attractive scheme.
It is questionable w hether such a system would be in the range of competences of the European legislator. As art 48 TFEU provides, the European Parliament and the Council shall make arrangements to secure aggregation and payment of benefits to persons resident in the territories of M ember States.123 Such undertaking undoubtedly presupposes Mem ber States' social security systems independent of European legislation.124 Moreover, the proposal's definition of a m igrant worker remains rather unclear. Are m igrant workers only those who work more than two weeks, two m onths or two years in a country other than his original workplace? If such a strict lim itation is envisaged, the proposal could be rendered practicable b ut would in any case exclude a smaller or greater group of potential applicants resulting in some rem ainder of the current coordina tion system. This w ould essentially result in doubling the current bureau cracy as contacts between the ESSS and the M ember States would have to be coordinated as well. If this is to be avoided, an opt-in of virtually everyone ever paying a work-related visit to a M ember State m ust be perm itted to join which would clearly violate the competence set out above. Finally, due to the distant m aturity of the ESSS, benefits could indeed be upgraded and thereby elevate the attractiveness of the system. This however would result in a currently carefully-avoided intra-firm inequality. Two sorts of social protection would co-exist in one work setting.125
The current state of coordination of workers' compensation and employ-74 ers' liability constitutes a whole area of law which is extremely well developed and apparently operates well enough for all parties concerned as for several decades m igrant workers, their employers and social insurers have been protected and have become familiar w ith a system which, despite its at times complicated character reveals upon close inspection its ability to function sufficiently well.
